Here is a paper that I have been working on. This is kind of a first iteration and I hope to expand upon it a lot more, but it gives you a pretty good idea of the topics I have been covering. Coming into this semester I had no real concept of any of this so the learning curve has been a bit steep, but I guess that is what makes it so fun. I hope it isn’t too boring. Cheers!
~Matt
On April 5, 2009, President Obama addressed a massive crowd in Prague and articulated his commitment to working towards “a world without nuclear weapons.” In the next year there will be a multitude of reviews submitted and conferences attended that will have a large effect in shaping the policies that will guide the implementation of Obama’s goal. These reviews include but are not limited to the Nuclear Posture Review, Ballistic Missile Defense Review, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, and the Quadrennial Defense Review. Also, the US is involved in negotiating the START follow-on treaty, now dubbed “new START,” which looks at the next step in nuclear force reductions for the US and Russia. Commentaries and predictions on all of these documents and meeting are very prevalent in the blogosphere, newspapers, and forums. The thing that is missing in the discussion seems to be what comes after this step.
Right now nuclear force reductions are mainly a bilateral dialogue between the two nuclear “super powers,” US and Russia, but as the US and Russia lower their numbers other nations such as India, Pakistan, Israel (allegedly), and China are building up their nuclear stockpiles. In addition to these already established programs, North Korea and Iran each have nuclear weapons programs that are either in their infancy or conception stages, but none the less striving to start a build up. At what point in nuclear force reduction negotiations do we need to consider these other nations as major players? At what point, and when, do we expect the negotiations to go from bilateral to multilateral? What are the conditions that need to be taken into consideration as our nuclear weapons levels dive below 1000 and other nations, who never before in history had anything close to this level of leverage, begin to achieve nuclear parity? Finally, how do you broach the issue with a nation like Israel who depends on nuclear weapons and the ability to exact disproportionate damage upon their neighbors as a matter of survival within their hostile neighborhood?
Before we start worrying about what a nuclear-free world looks like, let’s take a look at some of the problems that may arise before that point and start the dialogue of possible solutions. Israel, India, Pakistan, and China all rely on nuclear secrecy as their deterrent. If their potential enemies knew how many nuclear weapons they have and where they are located, it would be perceived as a serious security risk by these countries. Convincing them to divulge this information will not be easy, but it will be necessary to achieve this in order to continue cutting forces here in the US. The US will never haphazardly lower their numbers lower than one of these nations for fear of losing the leverage necessary to assure their allies and ensure their own security.
The chart below shows estimated nuclear warhead inventories. As you can see, the US and Russia have dramatically reduced their inventories since their peaks, but they still have an overwhelming majority of the world’s nuclear weapons. For now, the bilateral agreements with Russia have the most effect in lowering overall numbers of nuclear weapons, but as the countries in the lower chart continue to build up, their ability to offer deterrence and to pose a proliferation risk increases. Their influence in regional and global conflict also rises.
Estimated Nuclear Warhead Inventories
Peak # of weapons (year) US 32k (’67) Russia 40k (’86)
Current weapons (total) US 9,400 Russia 13,000
Strategic operational US 4,700 Russia 4,100
Non-strategic operational US < 500 Russia 3,800
Reserve and awaiting US 4,200 Russia 5,100 dismantlement
**The United States has reduced its warhead total by about a factor of four since the end of the Cold War, and Russia has reduced by almost a factor of four.** —National Nuclear Security Administration March 16, 2009
Other Nuclear Countries Today
Country Number of Weapons
China 400
France 300
United Kingdom < 200
Israel 100-200
India 50-60
Pakistan 60
North Korea “a few,” <10
Sources: Nuclear Threat Initiative; Dr. Sig Hecker; Federation of American Scientists
Of these countries, Pakistan is the most worrisome right now and possibly in the future as well. Pakistan is in the middle of fighting a determined extremist uprising and is teetering on the edge of unmanageable instability. If their government were to fall, there is no plan for the securing of their nuclear weapons. Their government is wary of outside assistance on personnel reliability programs (PRP), permissive action links (PALs) codes, and physical security. They say their need for nuclear weapons is to counter India’s nuclear weapons and to compensate for having to be engaged in fighting the Taliban in the west and guarding the border with India, who they claim has a “cold-start” doctrine. The cold start doctrine involves India moving their Strike Corps into position with their Defense Corps near the borders to alleviate the long drawn out process of mobilization. So at the drop of a hat, India is ready to engage in offensive military conflict. In place of maintaining a larger army, Pakistan has decided to use their nuclear arsenal as a deterrent of Indian aggression. Recently in an international conference, a Pakistani general claimed that Pakistan may have to start mating warheads with delivery vehicles and possibly deploying them, in order to ensure a second strike capability. This statement is particularly troubling due to the myriad security issues this causes, especially in a country with an active and able terrorist network.
Pakistan and the US need to open a dialogue to find areas that they can cooperate on in the hopes of establishing trust. The US doesn’t doubt the efforts of the Pakistani government or their sincerity in wanting to have the most effective nuclear security, but being in such close proximity to escalating instability creates a situation where going it alone is bordering on plain irresponsibility. What areas can we cooperate on outside of the US just handing over billions of dollars that are not able to be accurately accounted for? Especially in light of the news report that quotes retired Gen. Mahmud Durrani, who was Pakistan’s ambassador to the U.S. under Musharraf, claiming that only 7.5% of the $6.6bil of US aid was actually used to fight the war on terror as it was intended.
What types of areas can we cooperate in an emergency recovery effort? What avenues for outside assistance are in place to react to an accidental transfer of possession? What types of military exercises can we engage in to address areas of lag in order to streamline an effective coordinated joint response? What can be done to prove to Pakistan that the US is only interested in making sure their nuclear assets are safe and secure, not taking them away? As time marches on and Pakistan continues to build up, their arsenal will continue to become more vulnerable, especially if they put their weapons on a higher alert status with the extremist threats still present.
In addition to the Pakistani dilemma, Israel presents a snag for completely different reason. Since Israel’s founding, they have been living in a very hostile neighborhood. They are surrounded by countries that have expressed their desire to see them wiped off the face of the Earth. With such a relatively small population and very small land mass, Israel’s security challenges are great. Their alleged nuclear program serves as the cornerstone of their deterrence doctrine.
For Israel, nuclear weapons allow them to promise disproportionate damage on a grand scale should any country or coalition rise up against them. Also they have a need for low yield nuclear weapons to serve as battlefield substitute for their small army. In a recent workshop, an expert on Israeli security issues described the example of Israel fighting a multi-front war much like the Six Days War, but on a much larger scale. It would be impossible for Israel to sustain combat for very long and would need the ability to use nuclear weapons where they were physically unable to defend themselves.
High-yield nuclear weapons, as opposed to the low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons, are allegedly possessed in the hopes of deterring the hostile nations surrounding Israel from ever attempting to take Israel by force. The promise of large-scale destruction is a credible threat from the Israelis. Israel views this capability as essential to their deterrence goals. Where the problem occurs is when Iran develops nuclear weapons and is able to match Israel’s capabilities; Israel no longer possesses a credible deterrent and their very existence is threatened, which dramatically lowers the nuclear threshold. It would take a dramatically smaller number of nuclear weapons to completely lay waste to the tiny nation of Israel, so even a couple nuclear weapons in the hands of one of the hostile regimes in Israel’s neighborhood would be a cause for intense concern.
In terms of arms reductions and controls treaties, the US and Russia are going to be extremely reluctant to move too much past the START agreement they are currently crafting without some sort of cooperation from China. China possesses the capability of hitting the US and Russia with their global nuclear strike packages. In ten years they may have nearly doubled their current stockpile; putting them on a fairly level playing field with the two nuclear “super powers.” This prospect should be equally as disturbing to Russia as it is to the US especially with their proximity to China.
Also China played a large role in helping Pakistan start their nuclear program and has been aiding North Korea to alleviate the effects of the UN sanctions meant to punish their nuclear weapons endeavors. They will most likely prove to be a difficult treaty partner. With their history of not entering into security agreements, there is a reasonable chance that China will not enter into an agreement with the US and Russia. If this happens, then the US and Russia will have no choice but to redefine their nuclear programs in the interests of national security.
So with the initiative of Global Zero in place, the problem of who will monitor the world and ensure that no one is cheating on the commitments of nonproliferation and disarmament exists. Will the IAEA be charged with this task? Will a separate body be created to handle this enormous task? What would it look like? The task of monitoring every country in the world seems a bit daunting. Even countries that have never had an interest in nuclear weapons or were far too impoverished to consider setting up a nuclear program would have to be closely supervised. Is it too far-fetched to consider a situation in which North Korea or, more likely, Iran covertly pay an authoritarian dictator, who runs a tight-fisted closed society, for the use of remote land to build an underground facility to continue their enrichment endeavors?
Will it be possible to unlearn nuclear technology? In a world with no nuclear weapons, conventional weapons capabilities would be dramatically advanced and conflict thresholds would be dramatically increased. We would be living in a very unstable world where everyone would be wondering who was going to be the first to break the rules and develop a nuclear weapons program effectively able to hold the world hostage or setting off a massive conventional war in which use of their nuclear weapon would much more likely than in today’s environment.
US policy makers have a very fragile road ahead of them. With the US nuclear stockpiles aging and becoming more unreliable, they need to think seriously about funding nuclear surveillance and modernization programs. They need to invest in ensuring the ability to assure our allies. John Harvey from National Nuclear Security Administration, in a speech given in June of this year at an NDUI Congressional Breakfast Seminar, says their facilities “date from the days of the Manhattan Project. Continuing operations in these facilities presents increased risks both to the nuclear weapons mission and to our people.” Funding for these programs are not popular with the nuclear doves, but are necessary to be able to move towards eventual elimination. Also modernization would help reduce or eliminate the need for testing. There are a lot of tough questions that need to be asked now. Failure to prepare now will surely lead to disaster later.
